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Nuclear Power in Lithuania

Updated Thursday, 28 March 2024

Lithuania closed its last nuclear reactor, which had been generating 70% of its electricity, at the end of 2009, due to European Union pressure.
Electricity was a major export until the closure of Lithuania's nuclear plant.
A new nuclear plant was planned to be built by GE Hitachi, but has not proceeded.
A key policy objective is to minimize energy dependence on Russia.

Operable
Reactors

0 MWe

Reactors Under
Construction

0 MWe

Reactors
Shutdown

2,372 MWe

Operable nuclear power capacity

Electricity sector

Total generation (in 2022): 4.8 TWh

Generation mix: wind 1.5 TWh (31%); hydro 1.0 TWh (20%); biofuels & waste 1.0 TWh (20%); natural gas 0.5 TWh (10%); oil 0.4 TWh; solar 0.3 TWh.

Import/export balance: 8.6 TWh net import (11.2 TWh imports; 2.7 TWh exports)

Total consumption: 10.7 TWh

Per capita consumption: c. 3800 kWh

Source: International Energy Agency and The World Bank. Data for year 2022.

Since the closure of the two reactors at Ignalina in 2004 and 2009, Lithuania switched from being an electricity exporter to importer, and significantly increased its consumption of natural gas and biomass (see below). In 2020 some 70% of the country’s electricity requirements were met through imports.

Integration into the European Union (EU) energy market is a strategic priority for all three Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). This was formalized by the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), signed by eight states of the Baltic region and the European Commission. The main goal of the BEMIP is to create a unified market of the Baltic Sea region. Full synchronization with the European continental grid is aimed for by 2025.

The planned Visaginas nuclear power plant constitutes an integral part of the BEMIP. Apart from about 60 km of Lithuania’s border with Poland, the three Baltic states are bordered by Russia and Belarus.

Interconnections have been established with: Poland – 'LitPol Link' (500 MWe, commissioned 2015); Sweden – 'NordBalt' (700 MWe, commissioned 2016); and Estonia and Finland – 'Estlink 2' (650 MWe, commissioned 2014).

Energy policy

Energy security has been a key priority for Lithuania (and other Baltic states) since 1990.

The 2012 National Energy Independence Strategy was cast around the Visaginas nuclear plant (details below), a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal, and rebuilding the power grid. The plan aimed to reduce energy reliance on Russia. The Visaginas power plant has not moved forward following a referendum in October 2012 in which two-thirds voted against the project proceeding.

Gas imports from Russia halved when the new floating Klaipėda LNG storage and regasification terminal started commercial deliveries in January 2015, the first contract being with Norway’s Statoil, for about one-fifth of the country’s needs (0.54 billion m³/yr over five years). Reducing dependence on gas imports from Russia has been a long-held policy priority for the government. On 2 April 2022 Lithuania’s energy ministry said the country was “seeking full energy independence from Russian gas” in response to the war in Ukraine (see information page on Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy). Later that month Amber Grid, the country’s gas transmission operator, confirmed all gas imports were taking place through the Klaipėda LNG terminal.

About 75% of heat (district and residential) is produced from burning woody biomass, after a major shift away from the use of natural gas. Biomass is harvested in Lithuania and imported from Belarus.

Nuclear power industry

Nuclear Power Plants in Lithuania Map

In the northeast of the country^a, Lithuania hosted the two largest Russian reactors of the RBMK type. These Ignalina reactors were originally 1500 MWe units (1380 MWe net), but were later de-rated to 1300 MWe (1185 MWe net)^b. Construction started in 1978 and they came on line at the end of 1983 (unit 1) and in 1987 (unit 2)^c, with a 30-year design life. Lithuania assumed ownership of them in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They were light-water, graphite-moderated types, similar to those at Chernobyl in the Ukraine^d. Construction on a third reactor at Ignalina commenced in 1985 but was suspended after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, and the unit was later demolished.

Originally the Ignalina plant was designed to provide power not only for Lithuania but also for neighbouring Latvia, Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. In 1989, 42% of the power was exported, but this fell through the 1990s.

In 1994, Lithuania agreed to accept funds – eventually 34.8 million ECU ($36.8 million) from the Nuclear Safety Account administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)^e – to support a safety improvement program at Ignalina. The EBRD placed conditions on the grant, which evolved to include closing both units, at least by the time their pressure tubes needed replacing after some 15-20 years. Substantial upgrades were effected, with considerable help from other countries, notably Sweden.

Due to strong EU concerns about the RBMK reactor, by the time Lithuania applied to join the EU it was required to close them both down. Hence unit 1 was closed in December 2004 and, despite strong public opposition to its enforced closure¹, unit 2 was closed at the end of 2009, leaving Russia as the only country with operating RBMK reactors. The EU agreed to contribute towards decommissioning costs and some compensation, with support continuing to 2020. See later section on decommissioning.

The Ignalina plant was operated by Ignalinos Atominé Elektriné (IAE) and supplied power to national utility Lietuvos Energija at very low cost. Electricity prices increased dramatically following the closure of the plant at the end of 2009.^f

New nuclear capacity: Visaginas

In February 2007, the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Poland agreed to build a new nuclear plant at Ignalina, initially with 3200 MWe capacity (2 x 1600 MWe)^g. Though located next to the Soviet-era Ignalina plant near the Belarus border, the new one was to be called Visaginas after the nearby town of that name. The Visaginas Nuclear Energy (Visagino Atominė Elektrinė, VAE) company was established in August 2008 for the new units.

In April 2009, the Ministry of Environment approved the final Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report but imposed a 3200 MW limit on heat to be discharged into Lake Drukshyai, effectively capping the capacity able to use that at about 1700 MWe. Above this, cooling towers would be necessary. The EIA report considered a plant of at least two units of total capacity up to 3400 MWe, using one of the 11 reactor designs under consideration^h.

In 2009, the government commissioned an international advisory consortium, led by the Rothschild investment bank, to prepare a business model and financing plan for the Visaginas project. This was adopted by the government, which proceeded to invite expressions of interest by major strategic investors to supplement the role of regional partners in providing a plant up to 1400 MWe. This was put forward as an attractive investment proposition, with favourable environment, infrastructure in place, support from the EU Commission, and competition from Kaliningrad the only downside. The investor would get a majority stake (probably 51%) in the proposed new plant, alongside Lithuania's Lietuvos Energija, Latvia's Latvenergo, Estonia's Eesti Energia and (until December 2011) Poland's Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE)ⁱ. However, with Lithuania wanting 34% of the project and Poland then wanting 30% of it, Latvia and Estonia were unhappy with the prospect of minor stakes and the split was far from clear.

In April 2010, formal proposals from five selected strategic investors were submitted to the government, and bids from these were then sought. Early in December 2010, it was announced that the tender had failed after two bids were received. One undisclosed bid did not comply with tender requirements and the other, from Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco), was withdrawn two weeks after submittal⁸. The Lithuanian government said it would instead conduct direct negotiations with potential investors and that it expected to begin operation of the new plant in 2020. At an early December 2010 meeting in Warsaw, prime ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland confirmed their support for the Visaginas project.

In May 2011 "competitive proposals from potential strategic investors" were received, from Westinghouse and Hitachi-GE. In July the government selected Hitachi as strategic investor, though it would be GE Hitachi which does the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC). Lithuania's partners in the project, Estonia, Latvia and Poland participated in the evaluation to determine which of the two proposals was "most economically advantageous." Their energy companies would be investors with Hitachi in the project company.

GE Hitachi planned to build a single 1350 MWe ABWR, several of which are operating in Japan, or a pair of these. The first was expected to operate from 2020. A combined construction and operating licence was to be issued by July 2015. The cost of the project was estimated at €4.92 billion.

In October 2011 the government formally notified the European Commission of plans for the new nuclear power plant at Visaginas to be built in collaboration with Estonia, Latvia and Poland. However, in December Poland withdrew from the project, saying that VAE's conditions were unacceptable to PGE, and it had other plans anyway. In March 2012 the prime ministers of Estonia and Latvia reiterated their support for the project, a concession agreement with Hitachi was initialled and then in May signed, providing the contractual framework for the project and giving Hitachi a 20% stake in it. In May 2012 the Lithuanian parliament approved the project and the concession agreement. Initially Latvia was to take 20% of the project company and Estonia 22% for about €1 billion each. Lithuania would retain 38%.

However, a non-binding referendum held in conjunction with a national election in October 2012 clouded the prospects for the Visaginas project. The referendum question asked if voters wanted new nuclear power capacity built, and 63% said no. The Social Democrats had forced the referendum in order to make Visaginas an election issue, and they formed a government with Labor and two smaller parties (they had led a minority government 2004-08). They considered the project too costly.

In March 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, seven parliamentary parties* signed a broad agreement expressing consensus on the country’s security policy to 2020, including energy security. The agreement reaffirmed Lithuania's desire to reinforce cooperation with strategic partners – the Baltic and Nordic countries, the EU and the USA – as a principal foreign policy goal. It identified energy dependence as one of the greatest challenges to national security. Hence a priority “is to integrate as quickly as possible into the EU's internal energy market and to implement major energy projects, such as the LNG terminal, the Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant and power interconnections with Sweden and Poland.” The nuclear plant project has to be implemented “in accordance to the terms and conditions of financing and participation improved in cooperation with partners in order to expand the autonomous and competitive basic capacities of generating electricity.”

* The agreement was signed by Chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, Chairperson of the Labor Party, Chairman of the Homeland Union – Christian Democrats (former PM to 2012), Vice Chairman of the Order and Justice Party, Chairman of the Lithuanian Liberal Movement, Chairman of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, and representative of the Way of Courage Party.

In July 2014 an agreement with Hitachi regarding the project company was signed. In June 2015 Hitachi said that it expected the project company to be set up "in about a year", and the energy minister said that discussions were proceeding with Latvia and Estonia. Hitachi estimated the cost at about $4 billion, with it taking 20%, Lithuania 40%, and the balance from Latvia, Estonia and others. However, at the end of 2015 the project company was wound down and in November 2016 the government released a National Energy Strategy and said it was delaying the 3400 MWe project until it either becomes cost effective under market conditions or is needed for energy security.

While discussions proceeded regarding Visaginas, Russia started to build the 2400 MWe Baltic nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad. Russia's RAO UES (57% owned by Rosatom) signed an agreement with its Lithuanian subsidiary RAO Lietuva to export 1000 MWe of power from this to Lithuania from 2017. However, Lithuania contested the location of the Baltic plant since it is only 10 km from the border and 200 km from Vilnius, and it said that the environmental assessment did not meet the requirements of the Espoo Convention* governing such. The former government was therefore not keen to buy electricity from it. Poland also discontinued talks with InterRao regarding buying power from the Baltic plant. Rosatom said that it had responded to all Lithuania’s questions and sent more than 1000 pages of information to it. Rosatom subsequently, in June 2013, suspended construction of the Baltic plant due to lack of interest by the Baltic states, Poland and Germany in buying power from the project.

* Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. Belarus has ratified the convention, Russia is a signatory only.

Lithuania also objected on the same basis to Belarus' new nuclear power plant at Ostrovets, 23 km from the border and 55 km from Vilnius. Belarus claims to have answered all the questions put to it regarding siting the plant. Lithuania filed a complaint with the Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention, and in 2013 the committee ruled that Belarus had violated the convention. In 2014, a meeting of the parties to the convention "encouraged” Belarus to take measures to build confidence with neighboring countries concerning the project. They also suggested that Belarus invite the IAEA to carry out a site and external events design (SEED) mission at Ostravets. Belarus did so, and in January 2017 the IAEA team reported favourably for Belarus.

Baltic Energy Market Interconnector Plan

Visaginas was envisaged as the cornerstone of the new Baltic Energy Market Interconnector Plan (BEMIP) linking to Poland, Finland and Sweden, with Lithuania the hub. A high-voltage 500 MW DC southwest interconnection – LitPol Link – costing €250-300 million, to improve transmission capacity between Lithuania and Poland was commissioned in 2015^j. Much of the funding is from the EU. This follows inauguration of an interconnector between Estonia and Finland to the north – Estlink-1, a 150 kV, 350 MW DC cable costing €110 million and also supported by EU funding. Another major transmission link westward under the Baltic Sea, the 700 MWe NordBalt project, connects Klaipeda in Lithuania and Nybro in Sweden. The €550 million project was completed in 2016⁹. (The Baltic states and Belarus have good interconnection of grids from the Soviet era, but this did not extend to Poland, let alone to Germany. Kaliningrad gets much of its electricity from Russia, via Belarus and the Lithuanian grid.)

The revised energy policy in 2012 involved rebuilding the grid to be independent of the Russian/Belarus system and to work in with the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO) synchronous system, as well as strengthening interconnection among the three Baltic states.

However, in March 2013 Rosatom said that Russia had officially notified the European Commission (EC) that it wanted its Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad to join the ENTSO system. The EU authorized the EC to hold talks with Russia and Belarus on disconnection of the transmission systems of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the IPS/UPS system controlled by Russia. Rosatom renewed the proposal for a transmission link between Kaliningrad and Poland, and asked the EC to build this into the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIT) to obtain EU financial support. It appears that there was no positive response, and Lithuania continues to take measures to isolate Kaliningrad.

Waste management & decommissioning

The Radioactive Waste Management Agency (RATA) was established in 2001 by the Ministry of Economy for management and final disposal of all radioactive waste from the Ignalina plant. In 2018 the Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste was amended merging RATA with Ignalina NPP, and assigning sole responsibility for the management of all of the country’s nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel to the state enterprise.

In 2007, RATA identified a site close to Ignalina for a near-surface final repository for low- and intermediate-level waste and the government approved this. In August 2009, VATESI issued a licence to build the Solid Waste Management and Storage Facilities (SWMSF) at the Ignalina site for all solid operational and decommissioning waste. In November 2009 a consortium led by Areva was contracted to design the €10 million repository, which consists of reinforced concrete cells holding about 120,000 cubic metres of waste immobilized in a cement matrix. It occupies 40 ha close to the plant. After 2030 it will be closed, covered with multi-layer protective barriers, and finally monitored for 300 years. In June 2015 the Ignalina plant applied for a licence to operate the SWMSF. It was licensed in 2017, with hot trials commencing shortly after.

The SWMSF comprises two separate sites. The solid waste retrieval facility has been built next to the existing temporary waste storage buildings inside the perimeter of the Ignalina plant. The solid waste treatment and storage facilities have been constructed close to the plant, adjacent to the interim used fuel storage facility.

Due to the fuel pools at both reactors being essentially full, some used fuel is stored in dry casks onsite. A new interim spent fuel storage facility (ISFSF) was built by a consortium led by GNS-Nukem about one kilometre from the power plant. It was licensed in May 2017. It will store most of the used fuel that has accumulated over the course of the plant's operation. Some 18,000 RBMK-1500 fuel assemblies from Ignalina 1&2 will be stored in a total of 202 metal and concrete Constor M2 containers at the facility for 50 years. Phase 1 contract was for €93 million, and in 2009 an amendment for phase 2 took the project to €193.5 million, financed by the EBRD’s International Decommissioning Support Fund.

In 2010 VATESI licenced construction of a very low-level waste (VLLW) facility to store 60,000 cubic metres of VLLW from both operation and decommissioning of the plant, from 2011. It is close to the new used fuel storage facility and the solid radioactive waste treatment and storage facility.

Reactor decommissioning

Both Ignalina RBMK reactors are now being decommissioned. Used nuclear fuel from both units has been moved from the used fuel storage pools into casks and transported to the ISFSF facility, where it is to remain for 50 years. Dismantling of unit 2 commenced in mid-2014. Funding for this was suspended by EBRD in December 2012 due to lack of progress, but resumed in July 2013.

Shutdown power reactors in Lithuania

The total estimated cost of the Ignalina decommissioning project is over €2.5 billion. EU funding for this work is largely through the Ignalina International Decommissioning Support Fund (IIDSF) administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD) and two other funds administered by EBRD. About 95% of the required decommissioning funds are being provided by the EU member states, and the spending is being administered by a Central Project Management Agency (CPMA) and the EBRD. The other 5% comes from Lithuanian state funds through the state's own energy agency.

Regulation, safety and non-proliferation

In 1991, Lithuania's State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (Valstybinė atominės energetikos saugos inspekcija, VATESI) was set up to oversee Ignalina. VATESI is the state regulatory and supervisory authority for nuclear energy and the safety of activities involving sources of ionising radiation. It is now an independent institution which reports directly to government.

A technical support organization, the Independent Safety Analysis Group (ISAG) was also set up by the government at the Lithuanian Energy Institute in Kaunas to give technical assistance to both VATESI and the plant.

The Radiation Protection Centre oversees radiation protection, including monitoring of public exposure. It drafts laws and regulations on radiation protection.

Lithuania has been party to the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage since 1994. It became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1993.

Non-proliferation

Lithuania came under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and the Additional Protocol in came into force in 2000.

Notes & references

Notes

a. The Ignalina site is located near the town of Visaginas, 130 km from Vilnius, near the point where Lithuania's borders with Latvia and Belarus meet. The plant is beside a large lake, Lake Drukshyai, which was used for cooling. [Back]

b. The design capacity of the two Ignalina RBMK-1500 reactors was 4800 MWt (1500 MWe) each. Following safety concerns arising from the April 1986 accident at Chernobyl, it was decided to limit operation of the units to 4200 MWt, effectively derating them. [Back]

c. Construction of unit 2 commenced in 1980 and was completed in 1986. However, its startup was delayed until August 1987 due to the April 1986 accident at Chernobyl. [Back]

d. The Chernobyl reactors were RBMK-1000 units, which differ considerably from the RBMK-1500 units at Ignalina. The Ignalina units were fitted with an extensive accident localization system (ALS), which is a series of pressure suppression compartments that mitigates the effects of rapid steam production (for example due to a pipe break). Following the Chernobyl accident, several safety upgrades were made to existing RBMK reactors – these are described in the information page on RBMK Reactors. These modifications ensured that a runaway power excursion as happened at Chernobyl could not have occurred at the Ignalina units. [Back]

e. The Nuclear Safety Account was the first multilateral fund set up at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1993 to finance nuclear safety projects in central and eastern Europe. See the page on nuclear safety on the EBRD website (www.ebrd.com). [Back]

f. In January 2010 – the month following the shutdown of Ignalina 2 – electricity prices increased by 33.3%. [Back]

g. In February 2006, the prime ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed a communiqué towards building a new nuclear plant in Lithuania. Soon after, the heads of the three Baltic national energy providing companies – Lietuvos Energija AB, Eesti Energia and Latvenergo – signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on 'Preparation for Construction of a New Nuclear Reactor in Lithuania' with the three parties participating and contributing to the project on equal terms². A feasibility study launched by the MoU showed that a new nuclear plant costing €2.5-4.0 billion would be economically attractive and could be on line in 2015.

In July 2006, Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas invited Poland to join in the project, despite Lithuania's Baltic partners being against Poland's involvement. In December 2006, the Baltic states agreed to discuss cooperation with Poland and, in March 2007, it was announced that Poland was to participate. The envisaged capacity of the proposed plant was increased to up to 3200 MWe, up from the 800-1600 MWe capacity originally planned. Lithuania said it would have a 34% stake, with each of the other three parties taking 22%, but a formal agreement could not be reached.

In the first half of 2008, the Lithuanian Electricity Organization (LEO LT), a national energy holding company, was established by the Lithuanian government to raise funds for the new nuclear plant. The Lithuanian government held 61.7% of LEO LT and NDX Energija 38.3%. The government's 96.4% holding in Lietuvos Energija along with its 71.34% stake in RST (Rytų skirstomieji tinklai, Eastern Power Grid Company) were transferred to LEO LT; and NDX Energija transferred its 97.1% stake in VST (Vakarų skirstomieji tinklai, Western Power Grid Company) to LEO LT. Much controversy surrounded the formation of LEO LT and the general election at the end of 2008 brought in a new government (under Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius) that was against the company. At the end of 2009, parliament voted to dissolve LEO LT.

In the meantime, in July 2008, LEO LT decided to name the new plant after the nearby town of Visaginas, although it would be built adjacent to the Ignalina RBMKs. The Visaginas Nuclear Energy (Visagino Atominė Elektrinė, VAE) joint venture company was established in August 2008 for the new units. LEO LT initially owned all the shares in the new company and intended to retain 51%, leaving Poland, Latvia and Estonia 16.3% each.

Following the dissolution of LEO LT, at the end of 2009, the Lithuanian government officially began searching for strategic investors in the project (see Note i below).

In addition, Russia was building a nuclear plant in the Neman district of the Kaliningrad exclave, close to the border with Lithuania. This project to build two VVER-1200 units was seen as a direct rival to the Ignalina replacement project³. A ceremony marking the start of construction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant was held in February 2010, and full construction began early in 2012. Russia expeced to complete unit 1 by 2016 and unit 2 by 2018, if not sooner, but it is now suspended indefinitely⁴. Russia invited Lithuania to participate in the project but the invitation was declined⁵.

Belarus is also building a VVER-1200 nuclear plant, initially with two units⁶located in the Ostovets/Astravets district of the Hrodna region, near the Lithuanian border. Construction started in November 2013 and the first unit was connected to the grid in March 2020. [Back]

h. The 11 reactor designs considered in the EIA report are: AP600 (Westinghouse-Toshiba, 600 MWe PWR); AP1000 (Westinghouse-Toshiba, 1000 MWe PWR); EC-6 (AECL, 700 MWe PHWR); ACR-1000 (AECL, 1085 MWe PHWR); V-392 (Atomstroyexport, 1006 MWe VVER); V-448 (Atomstroyexport, 1500 MWe VVER); SWR-1000 (Areva NP, 1254 MWe BWR); EPR (Areva NP, 1660 MWe PWR); ABWR (GE-Hitachi, 1300 MWe BWR); ESBWR (GE-Hitachi, 1535 MWe BWR); APWR (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 1700 MWe PWR). A further design, the APR-1400, is reportedly under consideration. In February 2010, a senior Lithuanian delegation visited South Korea to discuss building a pair of APR-1400 reactors. These would probably be built and operated by Kepco as an independent power producer. The cost of each unit is about $5 billion, but some minor redesign to meet European Utility Requirements would be needed. [Back]

i. At the end of 2009, the Lithuanian government began searching for strategic investors to take a majority stake (probably 51%) in the construction and operation of a new nuclear power plant⁷. Lithuania intends to hold a 34% share, and the balance may be offered to regional partners from Latvia, Estonia and Poland, with whom VAE is also negotiating. The names of the possible investors were not revealed, but it is understood that interest was shown by 25 companies, including EDF, Suez-GDF, E.ON, RWE, Enel, Iberdrola and Vattenfall. The strategic investor is expected to buy a controlling share in the project implementation company. [Back]

j. The planned 154 km double-circuit HVDC 400 kV overhead line, connecting Alytus in Lithuania and Elk in Poland, is coordinated by LitPol Link. Established in May 2008, LitPol Link is a 50:50 joint venture between transmission system operators Lietuvos energija AB and PSE (Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne) Operator SA. [Back]